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In a health care system where resources are scarce and the principle of equity is of central 
concern, mechanisms for the appropriate allocation of resources based on the notion of relating 
resource use to some concept of need are essential.  Two key issues raised in the UK 
government’s White Paper The New NHS: modern, dependable are the ability first to define 
health care budgets at a local level and second to integrate budgets to encompass all relevant 
aspects of health care delivery.  This paper considers the theoretical and practical implications of 
devolving NHS budgets to primary care groups.  The paper advocates the development of a 
patient-based survey of all NHS health care utilization, which could serve as the basis for 
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For some years there has been a move in the UK towards a ‘primary care led’ National 
Health Service (NHS).  At the same time, a founding principle of the NHS is that equal 
access to health care should be available to those in equal need, regardless of individual 
circumstances.  This paper argues a shift of the focus of care towards the primary care level 
will require increasingly careful definition of “need”.  The paper therefore examines the 
implications of trying to measure need at the level of general practice, or groups of general 
practices. 
 
The recently elected government has continued the shift in focus towards primary care in the 
NHS, and the recent White Paper The New NHS: modern, dependable signals an increased 
emphasis on devolution of health care budgets.  In this respect, the White Paper builds on 
existing experience with general practitioner “fundholding”, in which health care budgets for 
a subset of elective procedures and for prescribing have been devolved to individual general 
practices which choose to participate. However, the new policy differs in three respects from 
the fundholding experience: first, the budgetary devolution will be to groups of general 
practices, in the form of Primary Care Groups, rather than to individual practices; second, the 
emphasis will be on commissioning and planning services, rather than purchasing; and third, 
the budget will encompass a much larger proportion of total expenditure than the standard 
fundholding budget.  In this respect, the new arrangements have much in common with the 
recently evaluated “total purchasing pilots” although even more ambitious in seeking to 
include primary care expenditure as well as hospital, community and prescribing services.   
 
In this paper we argue that, in order to secure an efficient and equitable distribution of limited 
health care funds, it is indeed important for devolved budgets to embrace all health care 
expenditure and not just a subset such as prescribing or fundholding procedures.  However, 
we identify a number of serious practical difficulties that must be overcome if successful 
devolution along these lines is to take place. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section outlines the importance and role of 
budgetary management in a health care system where resources are scarce. We then describe 
the essentials of the present ‘needs’ based formula used to allocate budgets to health 
authorities. This is followed by a discussion of how health authorities currently secure 
budgetary control in primary care. In section 3, we consider the move towards devolved 
budgeting and the implication this will have for resource allocations. Although we endorse 
the move towards a fully integrated system whereby PCGs will hold a ‘global budget’ from 
which they will be free to spend on all aspects of health care as they see fit, we acknowledge 
that – at least in the short term - the problems associated with this will be considerable.  We 
therefore highlight some of the major obstacles that require careful thought and research.   In 
a final section we call for the need for a comprehensive survey of individual NHS utilization 
designed specifically to address the issues expanded on in this paper and to secure a move 
towards ‘need’ based primary care led budgetary management. 
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2. BUDGETS IN THE NHS 
 
Budgets are perhaps the most important formal mechanism for securing managerial control.  
Emmanuel, Otley and Merchant (1990) set out five roles that budgets usually play: 
 
1.  authorization of actions; 
2.  a means of forecasting and planning; 
3.  a channel of communication and co-ordination; 
4.  a means of motivating organizational members; 
5.  a vehicle for performance evaluation and control. 
 
Whilst these roles may conflict, elements of all five purposes can be discerned in most 
budgetary systems.  In the NHS the principal role of the budget has probably been to signal 
command over resources, and thereby to secure adherence to public expenditure limits - a 
mixture of roles one to three. 
 
Expenditure in the NHS can be considered under three broad headings:  
 
•  hospital and community health services (HCHS); 
•  prescribing; 
•  general medical services, including expenditure on general practices. 
 
This section outlines the systems of budgetary control currently in place in these three 
categories.  See NHS Executive (1997) for further details. 
 
Hospital and Community Health Services 
 
Hospital and Community Health Services (HCHS) expenditure accounted for £20.9 billion in 
1996/97, or 76% of all local NHS expenditure in England.  These national funds are in the 
first instance devolved to health authorities with populations of about 500,000.  Setting cash-
limited annual HCHS budgets for individual health authorities has been central to the 
objective of restraining government expenditure on the NHS.  Of course such budgets could 
be set on the basis of crude criteria, such as a fixed per capita sum, or last year’s expenditure 
plus x%.  However, major efforts have been made to make health authority budgets as 
equitable as possible in terms of responding to variations in need (see below).  It is almost 
certainly the case that the attention to equity has helped to make acceptable the imposition of 
frequently severe cash limits.  
 
The methodology for setting HCHS budgets for health authorities has been developed and 
refined over a twenty year period.  The general principle is known as weighted capitation 
because a capitation allocation for each citizen is weighted for a number of relevant factors.  
Under weighted capitation, a target health authority budget can be expressed as follows: 
 
Budget = PerCap * Pop * (1 + a) * (1 + n) * (1 + c)  Towards Locally Based Resource Allocation in the NHS 
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The starting point for the budget is PerCap, the national per capita sum allocated for HCHS in 
the Public Expenditure System negotiations.  This is first multiplied by the local population size 
Pop.  The crude budget this yields is then successively adjusted for the age structure of the 
population (using the relative age factor a), the health care needs of the population over and 
above age (using the relative needs factor n), and the relative costs of local health care (using the 
relative cost factor c).  The national averages of a, n and c are zero. 
 
The age adjustment a is relatively uncontentious, and reflects the clear propensity of the very 
young and elderly people to require more health care expenditure than the rest of the population. 
 The needs adjustment n has been the subject of intense scrutiny.  Current methods involve the 
use of a set of relative needs indices for different parts of HCHS.  These include variables 
reflecting both health status and more general socio-economic status.  For example, the index for 
acute care, used to distribute 64% of HCHS expenditure, uses the following variables: 
 
•  Standardized limiting long standing illness ratio (under 75); 
•  Standardized mortality ratio (under 75); 
•  Proportion of economically active who are unemployed; 
•  Proportion of pensionable age living alone; 
•  Proportion of dependants in single carer households. 
 
The cost adjustment seeks to adjust for unavoidable differences in costs of capital and labour in 
different parts of the country, most importantly London and the south east.  A separate cost 
adjustment is calculated for each health authority. 
 
Health authorities are responsible for living within their annual HCHS budgets.  In this respect, 
they face a problem in the sense that HCHS expenditure is heavily influenced by the referral 
practices of a large number of individual GPs, over whom health authorities have little direct 
control.  Until the advent of fundholding, the major restraining influences have been supply side 
restraints, in the form of waiting lists for elective procedures and (in extreme cases) a refusal to 
undertake certain procedures.  Nevertheless, even before the 1991 internal market reforms, health 
authorities were generally successful in keeping within budget limits.  This success could not 
have been achieved without the widespread acceptance by GPs of the need to restrain health care 
expenditure.  
 
Primary Care: Purchase of HCHS 
 
The introduction of fundholding has allowed health authorities to devolve an average of 15% of 
their HCHS budget to general practitioners, mainly in the form of standard fundholding budgets. 
  This devolution encompasses a range of common elective procedures and prescribing (see 
below).  However it does not necessarily absolve the health authority of all responsibility for that 
element of their budget, as the majority of any overspend is likely to have to be met by the health 
authority.  Nevertheless, it was clearly hoped that the devolution would offer GPs a concrete 
incentive to restrain expenditure for the relevant services, as they were allowed to retain any 
underspend on their fundholding budget for expenditure on other patient services. CHE Discussion Paper 159    
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In contrast to the mature budget setting process for health authorities, setting budgets for general 
practitioners is still in its infancy.  An early attempt to develop a needs index for standard 
fundholding procedures failed (Sheldon et al, 1994).  Subsequent guidance from the NHS 
Executive (1996a) urged health authorities to use some sort of formula to set fundholder budgets, 
and to ensure that fundholders and non-fundholders were treated equitably.  The Executive 
recommended use of a dampened form of the acute sector index mentioned above (NHS 
Executive, 1996b), and in practice many health authorities have tended to use similar methods to 
the NHS Executive weighted capitation approach in setting fundholding budgets.  This has 
entailed weighting each patient on a practice’s list by the patient’s age, and the health and socio-
economic characteristics of the small area in which the patient lives. 
 
The standard fundholding scheme has been augmented by the introduction of "total purchasing", 
encompassing virtually all HCHS services, including emergencies, and usually involving 
coalitions of several practices.  In contrast to standard fundholding, the total purchasing scheme 
is the subject of a thorough evaluation (Mays et al, 1997).  Participating general practices 
continued to be the formal holders of their own individual budgets, although the architects of the 
total purchasing scheme envisaged that eventually an entire site would receive a fully integrated 
budget. Budgeting emerged as a crucial issue in the development of the total purchasing 
experiment which has yet to be satisfactorily resolved. 
 
 
Primary Care: Prescribing 
 
In 1996/97 total prescribing costs accounted for £3.8 billion; 14% of all local NHS 
expenditure.  The NHS reforms and the creation of fundholding were intended, in part, to 
place greater emphasis on cost-effective prescribing in an attempt to control the rise in total 
prescribing costs.  Fundholding budgets include an element for prescribing costs, and 
fundholding practices have been required to meet prescribing costs out of the fundholding 
budgets which are allocated to them by their health authority. In contrast, non-fundholders 
are allocated an indicative prescribing budget.  This is a notional budget or target, and 
penalties for overspending play a much weaker role than for fundholders.  
 
Until relatively recently, budgets for prescribing at the health authority level were largely 
based on historical costs adjusted for inflation.  More recently, allocations to health 
authorities have moved towards a weighted capitation basis.  In 1996/97, for the first time, a 
very small proportion of the prescribing budgets was based on a needs weighting. After 
appropriate adjustments for the age, sex and temporary resident characteristics of practices 
(Roberts and Harris, 1993), a weighting for the proportion of people in the 1991 Census 
declaring themselves as unable to work due to permanent sickness or disability was applied 
to calculate health authority allocations (Rice et. al., 1997). 
 
Methodology for devolving health authority prescribing budgets to individual general 
practices is much less advanced. The indicative prescribing scheme sets implicit prescribing 
levels for non-fundholding practices, but because of the lack of incentives and penalties to Towards Locally Based Resource Allocation in the NHS 
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encourage compliance on the part of the GPs, the scheme has been criticised and has 
generally failed to control the rise in costs (Walley, Wilson, and Bligh, 1995).  Fundholding, 
although not reducing the total drugs bill, appears to have been successful in reducing the rate 
of increase of drug costs in participating practices (Department of Health 1994). This appears 
to be due to the obvious financial benefits to practices of being more conscious of the cost 
implications of their prescribing patterns. 
 
In the early years of fundholding, allocations to individual general practices were based 
extensively on an historical cost basis.  More recently advice to HAs has been to allocate 
prescribing budgets based on a capitation system known as known as ASTRO-PUs (Age, Sex, 
Temporary Resident Originated Prescribing Units).  These apply weights based on the age, sex 
and temporary resident structures of practice lists, and are applied to practice populations to 
derive an overall practice budget.  Used in this way, ASTRO-PUs represent a crude 
adjustments for the demands placed on practices due to readily measured characteristics of 
the practice list (Roberts and Harris, 1993; Lloyd et al, 1997).   
 
However, whilst this method of capitation accounts overall for a reasonable proportion of 
variation observed in prescribing costs across practices (approximately 25%) (Roberts and 
Harris, p488, 1993), there are wide variations between health authorities and practices.   
Factors such as out-of-hours services and prescription charge exemptions may account for 
some of the unexplained variation (Whynes, Baines et al. 1996). To incorporate such 
considerations in the budget setting procedure, initial budgets based on ASTRO-PUs are 
subject to bilateral negotiation between practices and health authorities to ensure that any 
special needs a practice may encounter are met. Clearly this practice may give rise to 
incentives for strategic behaviour and inequity in the sense that allocations are not related to a 
consistent concept of need. 
 
There is great scope for further understanding the mechanisms behind prescription cost 
variations, particularly at the practice level and in developing suitable models to allocate 
prescribing budgets on an equitable basis. Whether sufficient variation can be explained by 
relating costs to measures of need at the practice level is central to the issue of devolving 
budgets equitably.  
 
Research in the area of prescribing is bedeviled with methodological difficulties which need to 
be addressed before major inroads can be made into suitable resource allocation mechanisms.  
Some of the difficulties are common to all sectors of health care, and are addressed in more detail 
below.  Further issues of particular concern in relation to prescribing include: 
 
 
•  Consideration of practice supply characteristics (for example, is prescribing a 
substitute for other types of health care?) 
•  The interface between primary and secondary care led prescribing 
•  A lack of standardization of costs and items prescribed  
•  Patient prescribing history CHE Discussion Paper 159    
 
9 
•  Level of generic prescribing 
•  Level of repeat prescribing 
 
Primary Care: General Medical Services  
 
HCHS and prescribing account for 90% of NHS expenditure.  The major other category of 
expenditure is general medical services (GMS).  GMS embrace most aspects of primary care, 
including the provision of general practitioners and most of their staff.  Only a quarter of the 
overall GMS budget is subject to national cash limits (GMS “Cash Limited”).  The White Paper 
envisages that only GMS cash limited expenditure will be included in unified budgets in the first 
instance.  This includes funding of practice staff, premises and computers, but not remuneration 
of general practitioners. Current guidance issued by the NHS Management Executive for setting 
GMS budgets to the district authorities states that they are “... to be calculated consistent with the 
methodology for the reimbursement of non-fundholder costs for GMS staff” (NHS Management 
Executive, 1996).  Weighted capitation formulae were used in 1997/98 for allocations for Cash 
Limited GMS to health authorities, based on age, sex and ICD chapter stratified consultation 
rates, developed from an analysis of a survey of individual patients from a sample of practices 
using the MSGP4 survey (Royal College of General Practitioners et al, 1995).  There is an 
additional needs adjustment based on the (under 75) standardized illness ratio.  At present, we 
are not aware of any health authority actively seeking to introduce capitation methods for GMS 




Current resource allocation methods consider a number of discrete sectors of health care. Each 
sector is considered separately, and different methods have been used to derive capitations in 
each sector.  The favoured methodological approach has been wherever possible to base 
allocations on empirical data, in particular seeking to use the national average link between 
“needs” indicators and measures of utilization.  As a result, data limitations often determine the 
methods used.   Even though sectoral budgets are derived separately (for example for acute 
HCHS and psychiatric HCHS), they are often aggregated into a single budget.  Usually there is 
no obligation for budget holders (such as fundholders) to adhere to the individual components of 
their budget for each sector, so long as they adhere to the total budget. Towards Locally Based Resource Allocation in the NHS 
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3. DEVELOPING WEIGHTED CAPITATION BUDGETS IN PRACTICE 
 
In many ways the move towards a primary care-led NHS should make the distinctions between 
service headings such as prescribing and fundholding procedures irrelevant and unhelpful, as a 
principal objective of the initiative is to encourage GPs to secure the best health care for their 
patients subject to budget constraints, regardless of the service heading under which the care is 
found (UK Government, 1996). Any partitioning into separate budgets runs the risk of artificially 
constraining ‘rational’ assessment by the GPs of the alternatives.  Furthermore, a global budget 
offers no opportunity for GPs to shift expenses to services not covered by their budget. For 
example, the standard fundholding scheme embraced only routine elective surgery, which 
accounts for just 20% of HCHS expenditure. There has therefore been an incentive for 
fundholding GPs to refer patients as emergencies, which lie outside the ambit of their budget, 
thereby transferring financial liability to the health authority.   
 
The existence of such incentives clearly offers the potential for inefficiencies.  In principle, 
therefore, GP treatment decisions can only be made in an undistorted way if (a) budgets capture 
all expenditure caused by GP decisions (b) GPs have complete freedom to switch between 
expenditure headings - that is, separate budgets are not set for specific services.  In practice, 
however, there may be many reasons why this counsel of perfection is neither attainable nor 
indeed desirable.  Amongst the most important reasons for caution are: 
  
•  it may be very difficult to set what are perceived to be equitable global budgets; 
•  at a strategic level it may be perceived that certain functions (say preventative medicine) 
could be squeezed out by more urgent health care demands, in which case there may be a 
case for "ring-fencing" the associated budget to ensure that GPs do not neglect the service; 
•  it may be unreasonable to expect general practices to take on certain health care risks (such 
as, for example treatment of HIV/AIDS), for which the associated budget might be held at 
the health authority or even the national government level; 
•  more generally, the unpredictable variation in local health care needs may be very high, 
rendering any budgets meaningless; 
•  GPs may not have the available information or the decision-making skills to make the 
rational and efficient decisions demanded by the unconstrained budget; 
•  the management costs associated with devolution may be very high;  
•  it may be impossible to design satisfactory rewards and sanctions for underspending or 
overspending budgets. 
 
We nevertheless believe that the devolution of budgets to PCGs is on balance likely to be 
beneficial, and moreover consider that it is essential that some attempt should be made towards 
setting budgets for individual general practices.  We therefore now consider the practical 
implications of such a development.  The experience of practice-based budgets noted above has 
highlighted difficulties that were not apparent at the health authority level.  These can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
 CHE Discussion Paper 159    
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•  the health authority databases of patients registered with GPs usually indicate larger 
populations than population estimates prepared by the Office of National Statisitics - 
the phenomenon known as  “list inflation”; 
•  there is extremely limited universally available information on individuals – in practice 
it is confined to age, sex and postcode of residence, leading to the use of small area 
data as the basis for capitation adjustments; 
•  with current procedures all patients in a small area are therefore weighted equally, yet 
there is no reason to suppose that 
 in general patients attending a particular practice are 
representative of the area in which they live (the so-called “problem of attribution”); 
•  expenditure variations from expected per capita expenditure become very large for 
small population sizes, such as lists for individual general practices. 
 
In the long run, as patient databases become more reliable and comprehensive, some of these 
problems may be overcome.  However, they present serious obstacles to setting equitable GP 




Budgets for health authorities are based on contemporary projections of population produced by 
the Office of National Statistics.  UK population estimates have been the subject of some 
methodological difficulties, mainly arising from substantial evidence of incompleteness of the 
1991 Census of Population, which serves as the basis for current estimates.  However, for the 
purposes of resource allocation to such large areas, the population estimates are generally 
considered to be adequate. 
 
However, national population estimates are not in general suitable for allocations to smaller 
areas.  Although estimates are produced for local authority wards, these are subject to 
considerable potential error, particularly when age specific populations are examined.  More 
importantly, if the general practice is the unit of interest, geographical population estimates are 
inappropriate, as a practice may draw its patients from a variety of wards, and residents of a 
specific ward may use a variety of general practices. 
 
Therefore the unit of population used to set budgets for individual practices or PCGs must be the 
practice list. These are maintained by health authorities, and at that level, provide very different 
population estimates from those suggested by the national estimates. GP lists in England are 




The general view is that the health authority practice lists are unreliable (because of mobility 
among young adults and delays in removing list members on death and emigration) and could be 
dramatically improved (although, of course, there will always remain problems in registering 
immigrants, temporary visitors, the homeless and refugees).  Insofar as reasonably uncontentious 
budgets can be set for health authorities, this would not be a source of great concern if the 
inflation were uniform across a health authority.  Practice and PCG could simply be scaled down Towards Locally Based Resource Allocation in the NHS 
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(or up) to conform to the health authority budget.  However, there is evidence of substantial 
inflation variation within health authorities, with for example list inflation ranging from 3% to 
27% amongst individual practices in one London authority.  Furthermore, these variations are 
likely to be even greater within particular age groups, which may exacerbate anomalies in 




The amount of useful information currently universally available about patients on a GP list is 
minimal, being limited to age, sex and postcode.  Its usefulness as a tool for resource allocation 
purposes is therefore severely constrained.  There is no reason why, in principle, GP lists should 
be subject to such limitations, and the development of the NHS patient number offers the 
opportunity to ensure that the vast bulk of the population is attached to one and only one practice 
and that more extensive and reliable information is attached to the record.  However, any such 
improvements will pose formidable practical problems and have significant expenditure 




If the GP list is to be used as the basis of budget allocations, it will in the future be desirable to 
incorporate as many routine data items as possible into patient records in order to facilitate the 
development of a sensitive capitation formula.  Any item that is included should in principle be: 
 
•  useful - an acknowledged risk factor; 
•  reliable - not subject to major errors; 
•  practical - readily collected at reasonable cost; 
•  universal - available for all patients; 
•  objective - not subject to substantial variations in judgement; 
•  up-to-date - capturing contemporary circumstances of the patient; 
•  free of perverse incentives - in particular, not encouraging GPs to over-treat or under-
treat, or to distort reports of health status. 
 
In practice, the range of factors that satisfy these criteria is likely to be quite small.  Age and sex 
clearly satisfy all, and will always form the basis of any system.  However, almost all other 
conceivable items fall down on one or more of the criteria.  For example, many measures of 
health status may be subject to judgement on the part of patient or GP (for example, self reported 
measures of health such as limiting long term illness (Sutton et al 1997)), and may be difficult to 
keep up to date.  Social circumstances, such as living alone, may change from time to time and 
be difficult to define in any watertight fashion. Economic circumstances, such as employment 
status are even more difficult to update.  One of the more important risk factors may be a 
measure of past health care utilization.  An important research agenda is therefore (a) the extent 
to which any of these can be used for resource allocation purposes and what effect they would 
have on allocations, and (b) whether the use of any of them would induce any unintended 
behavioural responses on the part of GPs or other health workers. CHE Discussion Paper 159    
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The Problem of Attribution 
 
Hitherto, because of the difficulties of obtaining individual data outlined above, British resource 
allocation methods have used the characteristics of the small area in which an individual lives - 
rather than that individual's own circumstances - as the basis of a capitation formula.  This has 
many advantages, most notably the vastly increased volume of data that become available as a 
basis for resource allocation.  However they bring with them the difficulty that the circumstances 
of the individual may not be typical of the area in which they live, and that the patients from a 
small area on a particular GP's list may not be representative of that small area as a whole.  This 
is the "problem of attribution".   
 
An associated problem is the adequacy of any small area data used.  Data from the Census of 
Population are available only every 10 years and therefore date rapidly and may suffer from 
incomplete enumeration.  Furthermore, the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys has itself 
documented the possible bias when using Census data at the smallest area level – the 
enumeration district, with a typical population of 500 (OPCS, 1993).  This arises from the 
problem of random fluctuations arising from small numbers and is exacerbated by the practice of 
“Barnardization” (entailing the quasi-random addition of -1, 0, +1 to all counts except basic 
population).  This problem is especially relevant to use of 10% sample tables, and may mean that 
data from larger areas (such as wards, with average populations of 5,000) may in fact yield more 
reliable estimates of the aggregate characteristics of individuals living in the small area. 
 
The pitfalls associated with linking small area data to individuals is known as the "ecological 
fallacy" (Selvin, 1958), under which associations observed at the area level are wrongly inferred 
to exist at the individual level.  The Fourth National Morbidity Survey in General Practice 
(MSGP4) contains GP consultation data on all patients (approximately 500,000) registered with 
60 participating practices over a one year period.  Socio-economic data were collected by means 
of a questionnaire administered to each individual which yielded an 85% response rate.  Area of 
residence postcode linkage allowed Census small area statistics data to be attributed at both the 
ward and enumeration district level to individual patients.  
 
This permitted an analysis of whether the assumption that enumeration district data reflected the 
aggregate characteristics of people living in a district better than ward level data (Carr-Hill and 
Rice, 1995).  The mean consultation rates for different categories of social class, tenure status 
and unemployment status across all individuals were shown to display the expected associations. 
 However, when the enumeration districts and wards in the study were grouped according to the 
social class distribution, the level of owner occupancy, or the unemployment rate, there was 
substantial evidence of the ecological fallacy.  Moreover, no significant improvement was 
detected when moving down from ward to enumeration district level.
1 
 
                                                 
1 Note, this type of analysis is a strict test of the ecological fallacy because precisely the same individuals were 
compared using first individual and then small area data. 
 Towards Locally Based Resource Allocation in the NHS 
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Clearly the extent to which the problem of attribution gives rise to distortions in budget 
allocations (and consequent incentives to recruit healthy patients from deprived areas) is an 
important empirical research matter.  If the problem of attribution is found in practice to be of 
relatively minor importance, the need for more comprehensive personal records may be called 
into question. 
 
Sources of Variations from Budget 
 
Annual health care expenditure on individuals is highly variable and largely unpredictable.  Such 
variation can be considered under five headings: 
 
1.  variation that is predicted by the relevant capitation formula; 
2.  other variation which is in principle predictable (given the individual’s characteristics) 
but which is not captured by the current formula; 
3.  variation which is due to clinical practice; 
4.  variation which is due to local health care prices; 
5.   variation which is random (that is, for practical purposes unpredictable). 
 
In general, only the first of these sources of variation is captured by the budget.  The second, 
predictable source of variation reflects incompleteness or errors in the current formula.  There are 
always likely to be needs factors that cannot be captured in a capitation formula, and yet which 
are observable by individual general practitioners.  If GPs are able to predict that expenditure on 
a particular patient will vary from the associated capitation payment, the potential for cream-
skimming arises (Matsaganis and Glennerster, 1994).  Cream-skimming is the process whereby 
GPs either seek out patients to add to their lists who are expected to have low costs relative to 
their capitation payment, or seek to deter or remove from their lists patients whose costs are 
expected to exceed the associated capitation payment.  Although the incentive for cream-
skimming exists under most systems of health care, there is no evidence that it has hitherto been 
a major issue in the NHS, even after the advent of fundholding.  However, as the budgetary 
process starts to encompass a larger proportion of health care expenditure, and if sanctions for 
overspending were to become more severe, then it may assume more importance.  
 
The third source of variation – variations in clinical practice - should properly be ignored by a 
resource allocation formula, which seeks to capture some “standard” set of clinical practices.  
The fourth source of variation may need to be incorporated into a budget if there exist 
unavoidable variations in input prices.  In England, a complex “market forces factor” is used to 
accommodate such variations in hospital and community health services (Institute for 
Employment Research, 1996).   
 
The fifth, unpredictable source of variation can be considered “random”, in the sense that it 
defies all attempts at systematic modelling.  For an individual patient, unpredictable variations 
from the annual capitation implied by his or her needs rating are likely to be massive.  However, 
as patients are aggregated into populations, positive and negative variations will start to balance 
each other, so that the unpredictable per capita variation from the capitation budget becomes CHE Discussion Paper 159    
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smaller. Such aggregation is known as risk pooling. 
 
At the level of the health authority (with a typical population of 500,000) budget risk arising 
from the random element of variation is unlikely to be a major consideration.  However, at the 
level of the general practice, with typical populations of (say) 6,000, a number of authors have 
shown that budget risk is likely to be very large (Crump et al, 1991).  Martin, Rice and Smith 
(1997) suggest that, assuming cost per case contracts are used, a typical fundholding practice 
(population 10,000) has a 1 in 3 chance of incurring expenditure more than 10% away from its 
acute sector budget, compared to 1 in 400 for a population of 100,000.  The extent to which 
extension of the budget to other services would alter these figures will be an important 
consideration in the new NHS. 
 
Thus, for whatever reason, the actual expenditure incurred by a general practice is very likely to 
vary substantially from its budget in any one year.   This may lead to: 
 
•  low spenders  “spending up” to seek to justify their budget; 
•  high spenders imposing unjustified constraints on treatment and reacting with hostility 
to the budgeting system; 
•  patients with identical needs in different practices being treated differently; 
•  patients with identical needs in the same practices being treated differently depending 
on the time of year they present (Glazer and Schmueli, 1995); 
•  budget holding general practices or PCGs negotiating block contracts, thereby 
transferring the risk to providers; 
•  budget holding general practices or PCGs taking out insurance with a third party, 
resulting in an unproductive outflow of funds from the NHS. 
•   
Some of these responses may be severely dysfunctional. 
 
Given the discussion above, variations from budget might be for some or all of the following 
reasons: 
•  the budget formula is faulty or incomplete; 
•  the referral and treatment policies of the practice differ from the average assumed in 
the budget formula; 
•  the practice has negotiated contract prices which differ from the average assumed in 
the budget formula; 
•  the pattern of disease amongst practice patients differs unpredictably from the needs-
adjusted average assumed in the budget formula. 
•   
The managerial implications of the four sources are clearly very different. 
 
Clearly improvement in the capitation formula could offer some hope of reducing the problem of 
health needs variation.  Evidence from the US and the Netherlands (Newhouse et al 1989, van 
Vliet et. al. 1992) suggests that one possible way of improving the predictive power of the 
English capitation formulae would be to incorporate data concerning pre-existing clinical Towards Locally Based Resource Allocation in the NHS 
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conditions and past health care use of individual patients.  Two major difficulties would be 
associated with such innovations. First, they necessitate the development of objective measures 
of health status which do not depend significantly on clinical judgement.  In practice, this may 
imply reliance on previous health care expenditure. Second, they may offer a perverse incentive 
for GPs to increase expenditure on individuals in order to secure a higher capitation fee in the 
future.  
 
However it is important to recognize that, although the use of a capitation formula is essential, 
and that some improvement in capitation formulae can be envisaged, no formula - however 
refined – can capture all the variations in health care utilization.  Rather, Martin, Rice and 
Smith
 (1997) argue that unpredictable variations in health care needs (which are beyond the 
control of the GPs) are likely to be the dominant source of variation, suggesting that careful audit 
of such variations is essential before any managerial action is taken.   
 
In the absence of a perfect prediction of health care needs, there are a number of managerial 
strategies for handling the inevitable random fluctuations in health care expenditure for small 
populations (Martin, Rice and Smith 1997).  Budgets could be set for periods longer than one 
year; certain expensive treatments or certain predictably expensive patients could be excluded 
from the budget; or contracts could be organised to eliminate or share risk.  At the same time, if 
such arrangements totally protect a budget-holder, then the general practitioner effectively no 
longer has any incentive to restrain expenditure, which negates the original purpose of the budget 
devolution.  
 CHE Discussion Paper 159    
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4.  TOWARDS A HEALTH CARE USE SURVEY? 
 
Thus far we have considered present allocation mechanisms and some of the practical difficulties 
encountered using currently available data sources. In this section, we finish by considering how 
a survey of individual citizens may help to address the methodological problems inherent in 
current budget development.  
 
It is important to recall that – for practical reasons – budgeting methods in the various sectors of 
the NHS, such as the acute sector, prescribing and general medical services, are currently 
developed separately, using different methodologies to derive capitation rates in each sector.  
Even though there is no need for the budget holder to adhere to each sectoral budget, this discrete 
approach may in principle give rise to methodological problems in determining fair budgets 
when, as in the NHS,  empirically based capitations are used.  The problem arises because there 
may be significant scope for alternative modes of treatment which imply an element of 
substitution between sectors – for example, prescribing as a substitute for GP consultations. 
 
Under these circumstances, a clearly better methodology than existing methods would entail 
basing capitations on the total use of NHS resources made by individuals across all sectors, 
thereby accommodating potential substitutions.  The method of setting a global capitation health 
care budget for an individual patient based on that individual’s characteristics might then be as 
follows.  There may be certain reliably measured characteristics of all citizens.  Let us suppose 
(purely for illustrative purposes) that they are age, sex, living alone and limiting long-standing 
illness (ignoring for the moment the difficulties associated with the last two).  This might yield a 
contingency table as follows: 
 
Age  Sex  With long term illness  Without long-term 
illness 
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Each cell would have a tariff, or capitation amount, associated with it (of course some cells might 
necessarily be empty).  Then a general practice’s budget would be determined by multiplying the 
number of patients in each cell by the associated capitation.   
 
Current methods are based on a hybrid approach.  Crude individual characteristics – namely age 
(and in some cases sex) – are used on a contingency basis, as in this example.  However the 
associated capitation is then adjusted up or down depending on the “needs” score derived for the 
small area in which the patient lives.  In principle, to use a pure contingency table approach 
would offer a more scientifically rigorous (and understandable) method for deriving capitations, 
which eliminates the problem of substitution, and overcomes the ecological fallacy.  However, 
this example begs the question: how are the capitation weightings to be derived? 
 
The obvious solution in principle is to undertake a sample survey of individual citizens. This 
would record all possible personal characteristics of individuals in the sample that could be 
routinely held by health authorities as part of all patients’ NHS administrative records.  Thus, 
apart from routine items such as age, sex and address, data such as long term illness and recent 
use of NHS resources might be included.  Considerable attention will have to be given to what 
social data - such as living alone - are to be recorded, and what mechanisms for maintaining the 
database are to be used.  There will be little point in including data which cannot be updated 
regularly and reliably.  The criteria for inclusion, already noted above, would be: usefulness; 
reliability; practicality; universality; objectivity; timeliness; and freedom from perverse 
incentives. 
 
The principal task of the survey would be to record all NHS utilization of the individual over the 
course of (say) a year.  (Note that, as we assume we are interested in NHS care only, we omit 
private health care expenditure.)  The survey might seek to capture inpatient, outpatient and 
community health care, prescribing and primary care consultations.  Such data in themselves 
would of course be invaluable.  However, the main intention would be to cost such utilization in 
order to identify the tariffs to be entered into the above contingency table.   
 
Statistical analysis could then be undertaken to identify which of the individual characteristics 
are the most important risk characteristics associated with NHS utilization. Here great care 
would have to be taken to model any important hierarchies in the data (patients within general 
practices within health authorities).  This is particularly important because of the likely 
importance of supply effects in determining utilization.  That is, the magnitude and pattern of 
utilization might be heavily influenced by the resources available to and the policies adopted by 
the relevant health authority and general practice.  It is for this reason that (a) great attention 
should be paid to the chosen sampling methodology and (b) modelling techniques which are 
sensitive to the hierarchical data structure should be used (Rice and Leyland, 1996). 
 
The most important risk factors would form the basis of the capitation scheme, and the survey 
results would be used to identify the weight for each risk class.  In this respect it may be 
necessary to use discrete multivariate techniques to “smooth” the contingency table.  Moreover, 
the contingency table approach implicitly seeks to model interactions between risk factors.  If CHE Discussion Paper 159    
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sample size was too small to secure reliable estimates, it may be appropriate to resort to analytic 
techniques to identify the impact of each factor independently, along the lines of the synthetic 
estimation methods used by Benzeval and Judge (1994). 
 
It is important to note that, although probably in practice the most satisfactory approach to 
deriving capitations, the contingency table approach in itself would not eliminate all of the 
problems noted above.  For example, if patient databases continue to be poorly maintained, 
inevitable distortions will arise.   And there would continue to be fluctuation around any average 
capitations used in the table, offering a continued scope for cream-skimming.  These problems 
must be addressed via other initiatives, such as improved information systems and careful audit 
to minimize cream-skimming.  Also, the method would still be based on empirical use of NHS 
resources, and would therefore not accommodate need that is currently unmet (or conversely 
inappropriate use of NHS services).  There would also be a need for careful treatment of any 
impact of local supply or utilization as measured in the survey.  There are moreover numerous 
details that would need to be resolved before any survey could be implemented, such as the 
sample size, the frequency of the survey, and how utilization would be measured.   
 
Formidable obstacles therefore stand in the way of implementing such a survey, not least its cost. 
 A great deal of preparatory work would need to be undertaken before embarking on such an 
undertaking, and there is a substantial research agenda associated with resolution of the 
methodological difficulties noted above.  However, as Carr-Hill et al (1994) emphasize, the 
potential benefits such methods would yield are enormous, and we feel that they deserve serious 
consideration.  Not least, they would settle once and for all the debate on whether the richer 
dataset offered by area level data compensates for the potential distortions to which the use of 
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